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The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age
Abstract
American trademark law is expanding. The expansion began with the adoption of
the Lanham Act in 1947. At that time and ever since, commentators and law makers
alike referred to the Lanham Act as a codification of the existing common law. In fact,
this codification was a selection and expansion of the common law. The United States
has continued to expand trademark jurisprudence: from incontestability, to cybersquatting,
to dilution - the notion of what it means to protect a trademark has
continued to expand. During this time, the Commerce Clause on which American
federal trademark protection is based has not changed.
The result of this inextricable expansion is that trademark jurisprudence in the
United States is becoming muddled. Originally, trademark protection was justified
as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive use
for as long as they used it and to the extent they used it. Now, the trademark right
has come to resemble the moral right of attribution andlor integrity of civil law
copyright systems.
This may be appropriate if the nation had a purposeful debate or discussion on turning
the United States trademark system into a system of moral rights. However, no
such discussion has taken place. Rather, Congress has enlarged the trademark right at
the behest of special interests without paying attention to the consequences. One consequence
is that trademark jurisprudence now has a striking resemblance to that of the
protection offered by moral rights in civil law countries.
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Abstract: 
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the Lanham Act in 1947. At that time and ever since, commentators and law makers 
alike referred to the Lanham Act as a codification of the existing common law. In fact, 
this codification was a selection and expansion of the common law. The United States 
has continued to expand trademark jurisprudence: from incontestability, to cyber-
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The result of this inextricable expansion is that trademark jurisprudence in the 
United States is becoming muddled. Originally, trademark protection was justified 
as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive use 
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I. Introduction 
In 1994, I predicted that a federal statute 
protecting trademarks from dilution was 
a dangerous notion as follows: 
A federal statute protecting "super 
trademarks" from dilution would create 
a copyright in the mark itself, as well as 
in the abstract idea of the mark in the 
minds of the consumer and manufactur-
ers .... Under dilution theory, the trade-
mark holder not only controls each 
expression of the mark, but also 
attempts to control the manner in which 
consumers or other manufacturers per-
ceive of the mark. In this mattel~ dilution 
theory attempts a monopolization of the 
idea of the work even outside of any use. 
In that respect, dilution theory violates 
the ideal expression dichotomy.' 
In 2000, I described and analyzed the 
expansion of American trademark 
jurisprudence and claimed that the United 
States had inadvertently created a Civil 
Law of trademarks, rather than remaining 
honest to our common law origins.' 
In the interim, this predicted expan-
sion has continued unabated. Trademark 
jurisprudence in the United States has 
inextricably expanded since the inception 
of the Lanham Act in 1947.' This article 
presents several examples of this expan-
sion. Incontestability, a doctrine created 
with the Lanham Act, was the first step'-' 
Trademark jurisprudence settled into a 
groove until 1989 when Congress created 
the intent-to-use (ITU) system.' In 1996, 
Congress enacted the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTOA).' In 2000, the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(ACPA) was enacted.' Throughout the 
history of the Lanham Act, Section 43(a) 
has gradually been expanding. However, 
it received a huge jolt in 1995 when the 
Supreme Court held that color alone 
could act as a trademark." 
The result of this inextricable expansion 
is that trademark jurisprudence in the 
United States is becoming muddled. 
Originally, trademark protection was justi-
fied as a right of exclusion that was grant-
ed to the user of a sign for their exclusive 
use for as long as they used it and to the 
extent that they used it. Now, the trade-
mark right has come to resemble the moral 
right of attribution and/or integrity of 
civil law copyright systems. 
This may be appropriate if the nation 
had a purposeful debate or discussion on 
turning the United States trademark sys-
tem into a system of moral rights. 
However, no such discussion has taken 
place. I\ather, Congress has enlarged the 
trademark right at the behest of special 
interests without paying attention to the 
consequences: one consequence being 
that trademark jurisprudence now has a 
striking resemblance to that of the pro-
tection offered by moral rights in civil 
law countries. 
l"--K~;;~leth L. Port, Tile "Umwluml" Etpallshm of Tmdemm'k Rigl!ts: Is a ret/Nal f)i/Illioll Stalule Necessary?, 18 SETON I-fALL LEGIS.). 
433,486-87 (J994l(winner, L«das Memorial Award). 
2 Kenneth L. Port, The Gmgressitmal Expal1sion of AmcriClIJI 'l/'adelllllrk '-'110: A Civil Law System ill Ille Makil1g, 35 Wilke Forest L. Rev. 
827 (2000). 
3 15 USc. §. 1052 (2008). 
4 See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1064, J065, 1115 (200S), 
5 Sec 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2008), 
6 Pub. L No. 104-98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 985, 985-86 (effective Jan. 26, 1996) kod ificd as amended (It 15 U.s.c. §§ 1125, 1127 (200Sl). 
7 Pub. L No. 106·113, §§ 3001-10, 113 Stat. 15OJA·5,15, 545-52 (1999) (effective Nov. 29, 1999) (codified at 15 USc. § 1125(d) (200S}). 
8 See Qualitcx Co. v. Jilcobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995). 
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Although some American scholars 
have made a career out of lobbying for 
moral rights; others have questioned 
either the necessity" or the desirability" 
of adopting a moral right scheme. 
Regardless of how one might come down 
on this issue, American trademark rights 
today have come to resemble the moral 
rights of attribution and integrity. 
Congress has done this with no discus-
sion or conversation about whether or not 
this is a good idea. Worse yet, when the 
Supreme Court has attempted to reign in 
this expansion, Congress has simply 
overruled the Court." 
Congress seems serious about affecting 
this expansion. Congress has been push-
ing this expansion most strongly in the 
last decade. Congress has been confront-
ed in this expansion by the Supreme Court 
but to no real effect." This conspiracy of 
expansion has gone on with no debate or 
discussion with the American people to 
decide if society wants an expanded 
trademark system. 
Rathel~ this conspiracy of expansion has 
resulted in small to medium sized corpo-
rations feeling extorted by large corpora-
tions over trademark rights." Therefore, 
this problem is not merely jurisprudential. 
In fact, it is quite real. 
As trademark rights expand to resem-
ble the moral rights of attribution and 
integrity, they become stronger and 
broader in scope. When they become 
stronger and broader in scope, they are 
asserted more aggressively against com-
petitors. This results in competitors 
changing their trademarks to avoid con-
flict. We know this is happening." This 
article tells the story of how, legislatively, 
this is done. 
Section II presents each major expan-
sion in American trademark history since 
the Lanham Act was created. Section III 
portrays the moral rights of attribution 
and integrity and how trademark protec-
tion has come to resemble them. Section 
IV discusses the tension that has been cre-
ated between the Supreme Court and 
9 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SoUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING II MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STA'IES (2010). 
10 See Rebecca Stuart, A Work of Heari: A proposa! for 17 revision of Ihe Visual AI'lists lI.igilts Act of 1990 10 Bring IIII' Ulliled SlalfS Closel 
fo III/mlll/iOlIllI Silmdards, 47 SANTA CLARA L REV. 645, 678-79 (2007) (The fighl of divulgation "has not proven to be a very importilnt 
right in the international community.")i Kimberly Y.w. Holst, A Case of Bad Credil?: The Ulli/ed Slates and Ihe Proteetio!! of Moml Rights ill 
)lJlellcctlial Properly Lnw, 3 BUFF. INTEU .. PROI'. L.J. 105, 128-30 (2006) (stating that the rights of disclosure and withdrawal do not need to 
be protected under the BenlQ Convcntion, because COllllllon law already protects these rights; by contrast protection for iltlributiOll and 
integrity have not had the sallle support from the courts). See also MEl.VILLE 13. NIMMER & DAVIt) NIMMER, NIMMER ON COJ'YllIGHT: A 
ThEATJSE ON TIlE LAW OF LrrEllARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPEIllY, ANI) THE PROTECTIO~ OF IDEAS 8D.Dl, 80-8 n.24 (I994) ("Note that a 
divlllgatioll right lllay exist in Berne by implication.")i SAM RICKErSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 476 (1987) ("There is no reference to [the right of disclosu]"Qj in article 6[bis], but it is possible to argue that 
such a right is required to be protected, by implication."). 
11 Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutilatillg Picasso: The Case For AmeJ1dil1g fhe \liwal AI"lists Rights Act to Provide Pro/ee/ioll of Moml Rights After 
D('iltil, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 897, 906 (2007) ("we should enact a high wall to prevent dismptive moral rights concepts from creeping into 
U.S. law.") (quoting senator Orrin Hatch). 
12 Following Moseley v. V Secret Cntalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) the Federal Trademark Djlution Ad (TDA) of 1995 was 
amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 §§ 2, 3(e), 120 Stilt. 1730, 1733 (effective Oct. 6, 
2006) (codified in 15 U.s.c. § 1125(c) (2008). 
13 Sec Wal-Mart Siores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays inc, 532 U.S. 23 
(2001); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 US 418 (2003); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.s. 23 (2003); KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 540 U.S. 1099 (2004). 
14 See e.g., Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, VI/ith a Trademark in Its Pocket, u,vi's Turns to Suing lts Rivals, NY Times, Jan. 29, 
2007, at AI, available at http://www.nylimes.colll12007 /01/29/business129jealls.html (Levi Strauss has filed !learly 100 lawsuits 
against competitors since 2001; Tonny Sorensen, chic[ executive of Von Dutch Originals, a relatively !lew competitor to Levi, claimed 
the purpose of the lil\vsuits is simply to "scare people away"). 
15 Id. 
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Congress over the appropriate scope of 
trademark protection. Section V presents 
some normative conclusions that this 
problem manifests. 
II. Doctrinal Expansion 
The trademark right in the United States 
has been on an inextricable course of 
expansion since (and including) the 
inception of the Lanham Act. The United 
States Congress has known only one 
direction in trademark law: expansion.'" 
However, the trademark law can expand 
only so much until it begins to resemble 
some other law such as the moral right. 
When it resembles a moral right, the 
basic theoretical justification for that 
trademark protection changes." Where it 
once used to be a right of exclusion 
limited to the extent of use and the 
duration of use, its justification has now 
changed to protection for protection's 
sake, which is not the original intent of 
trademark protection.'" 
A. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act went through a tortured 
history before it was finally passed in the 
days following World War II. There were 
multiple attempts between 1938 and 1946, 
when it was finally passed." The legisla-
tive history of the Lanham Act tells us that 
this is a codification statute-no new sub-
stantive law was created with the Lanham 
Act. It merely codified the existing com-
mon law with the intention of operating 
as a registration statute.'" As we shall see, 
this legislative history has not been real-
ized. Many new substantive rights have 
been granted. The first is the notion of 
"incontestability."" A trademark registra-
tion can become incontestable anytime 
after five years of consecutive use of mark 
on the identified goods or services." 
16 See e.g., Willis R. D.wi$, COll1melll, 11111'11110 Applications for Tradelllark J?egislmlioll, 35 W,\YNE L. REV. 1135, 1154 (1989) (stating tlwt 
Congress' adoption of the intent-lo-use system represents "a major practical alld theoretical shift" from traditional U.S. trademark law); 
Natalie J. McNeal, Vic/orill's Dirfy [jllle Secret: A Revealillg Look at Wlmf fhe Federal Trademark Dilutiml Act is Trying to Conceal, 56 OKI.A. L. 
REV. 977, 977, 983-S4 (2003) (discussing Congress' rapid and unexpected passage of the 1995 Federal Tfiidemark Dilution Act; an act 
which falls outside of the original scope of the Lanham Act); K,J. Greene, Abllsive Trademark Litigation alld the Incredible Shrillkillg 
COllfusioH Doc/rille-Trademark Abuse ill the COI1/exl of Elltertaillmellt Media mid Cylierspace, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 609, 610-13 (dis-
cllssing how Congress' expi'lHsion of trtl.demark rights, particuL1rly in regards to the Anti-Cybersquatling Consumer Protection Act of 
1999, has berm "dramatic") 
17 The Lanham Act's purpose is to protect the relevant consumer and ensure filir competition; it does not confer any property 
right in a trademark alone. See Unlted Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co" 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property 
in a (Tilde-mark, .. "). When protection begins to extend beyond simply indicating the source or origin of a product or service, trade-
mark law is llO longer is serving its originally intendi!d purpose, ld. 
18 One example of this is the "Intent to Use" provisions, which have the effect of creating rights in trademarks prior to their actua! 
use. See 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (b) (200S). Creation of rights before actual use is not an uncommon Ir<lit of civil law trademark jurisdictions, but 
is generally inconsistent with common law jurisdictions, especially the United States where trademilfk rights are based on the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which requires "interstate commerce" or actuill use. See U.s. Const. art.!, § S, c1. 3; 15 U.s.c. 
§ 1127 (2008). 
19 While the act was originally introduced in 1938, the interl'ening events of VVorld War II caused the passage of the Lanham Act 
to be delayed until after the war came to iln end, 1 THO)'lAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMI\RK5 AND UNFAIR CO),lI'ETITION § 5:4 (4th 
ed. 2007). See also FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, P,\TPdS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TllADI?MARKS 23 (2d. ed. 1993). 
20 See 15 US.c. §1127 (2008); J. THmfAS MCCARTHY, MCCi\lUHY ON TR,\DEMARKS ,\ND UNF,\lR COMPETITION § 11:49 at 11-105 (4th ed. 
1996) (stilting thaI the act has been recognized as il statutory restatement o( the corresponding common law). In passing this act con-
gress also hoped to bring American law into conformity with the more liberal principles of a number of foreign countries, stand<lrds to 
which the United States had pledged ildherence by treaty and convention. S. Rep. No. 79·1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S,CC.A.N. 1274, 1277. See illso, Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 E3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J. dissenting)(when the two con-
fliet, patent law should displace trademark lmv because patent law is recognized in the Constitution while trademark law is a mere 
codification of the common ]ilW). 
21 See 15 USc. §§ 1064, 1065, 1115 (200S). 
22 15 Us.c. §1065 (2008). 
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Given the advantages offered to an 
incontestable mark, it is remarkably sim-
ple to obtain incontestable status. An 
applicant merely needs to file a Section 15 
Affidavit and pay the proscribed fee to 
obtain an incontestable mark." There is 
no substantive evaluation of the mark or 
the claimed use. The PTO merely has a 
filing clerk check to make sure that the 
correct people have signed the Section 15 
Affidavit and other very simply formalis-
tic requirements." After that, the mark 
is incontestable. 
An incontestable mark has many statu-
torily created advantages over a non-
incontestable mark. Merely descriptive 
marks that have become incontestable are 
protected from a motion to cancel the reg-
istra tion." The Supreme Court went along 
with this expansion in Park N' Fly v. Dollar 
Park and Fly." There, the Supreme Court 
held that an incontestable mark could be 
used offensively, as well as to defend 
against a motion for cancellation." 
Therefore, Park N' Fly was allowed to 
use the fact that its mark had become 
incontestable as a basis to sue Dollar Park 
and Fly for trademark infringement, even 
though its mark was descriptive and 
therefore unenforceablec That is, save 
for the statutorily created notion of 
incontestability, Park N' Fly would have 
lost this case and we would likely have 
many "park and fly" providers at air-
ports around the country. However, 
because of this statutory gift, Park N' Fly 
prevailed. Therefore, there is only one 
provider of off-airport parking services 
under that name.29 
Another advantage of incontestability 
is the fact that Section 33(b) of the Lanham 
Act states that for an incontestable mark, 
"registration shall be conclusive evidence 
of the validity of the registered mark and 
of the registration of the mark, of the reg-
istrant's ownership of the mark, and of the 
registrant's exclusive right to use the reg-
istered mark in commerce."w Again, but 
23 The current fee for filing a §15 declaration is $200 per class of goods/services. USPTO Fee Information, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009seplember15.htm (follow "Trildemmk Processing Fees" hyperlink), 
24 "The USPTO neither examines the merits of §15 Declarations nor 'accepts' §15 Declarations. However, Ihe USPTO will review a 
§15 Declaration to determine whether it complies with statutory requirements." US1'TO, Trademark Process, Maintain/Hevie\\'" 
Registration, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/maintain/prfaq.jsp (last visited Sept. 1O,2010). 
25 15 U.S.c. § 1115 (2008) ("registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity ... of the registrant's exclusive right to use the 
registered mark in commerce .... and shall be subject (only1 to the following [nine] defenses."). 
26 469 U.s. 1S9 (1984). 
27 rd. at 205; see also id. at 193 (stating that "IOhe decision below is in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 E2d 366, cert. denied, 429 U.s. 830 (1976) .... we now reverse," 
thereby clarifying the split thai developed in Ihe circuit courts regarding offensiw use of incontestability). 
28 Id. at 205 ("[Tlhe holder of a registered mmk may rely on incontestability 10 enjoin infringement and that such an action may 
not be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive."). 
29 Bec,mse use of the word combination "park and fly" was banned, "DoHar Pmk ilnd Fly" was forced to change their name to 
"Park Shuttle N Fly." See http://www.hoovers.com/company /Dollar.Yark_and_Fly.Jnc/rrcrhjhhk-l.html (Last visited Sept. 10, 
2010); www.parksllllilleflypdx.com/(last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (showing "Dollar Park and Fly's" current address in Portland, Oregon, 
as the same as "Park Shuttle N FIy·s"). Despite losing the IllgaJ battle, the word "Shullle" in "Park Shuttle N Fly's" logo appears so 
small that the logo actually appears as "Pmk N Fly." Jd. SCe also their sister company's website, boldly named "Seattle Park N Fly," 
available at http://www.parknflyseattle.com/. The company filed a similar version of this logo with the USPTO in 1999, bllt f(liled to 
see ilthough to registration. See Registration No. 75640460 (Filed on Feb.I2, 1999). Holding several trademarks of their own, there is 
also a "Park Shuttle and ny" http://www.parkshuttlefly.com/(last visited Sept. 10,2010) locilted in Boston; no affiliation with "Park 
Shuttle N Ply"}. See their website, available at http://www.parkshuttlefiy.com/. Other competitors include: "Park, Sleep, Fly," avail-
able at http://www.parksleepfly.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); "Park, Rid(', Fly," aWlilahle at http://www.parkrideflyusa.com (Jast 
visited Sept. 10, 2010); and "Park, While U Fly," available at http://www.stayJ23.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
30 15 U.S.c. § 1115 (200S}(Colltilluing on to list only nine available defenses for a defendant to ("ontest an infringement claim from 
the holder of an incontestable mark). 
\. 
480 KENNETH L. PORT JPTOS 
for the statute, a trademark owner could 
never claim that its mark was "conclusive 
evidence" of anything." A claimant would 
have to prove each and every element of 
its cause of action. Therefore, the right of 
incontestability is quite strong." 
If the Lanham Act is a codification of 
the common law of trademarks," one 
would naturally wonder where this 
notion came from. Which state in 1946 
had a judicially created notion that would 
resemble incontestability? Of course, no 
such state existed. The best record we 
have of the origin of the notion of incon-
testability is that it was once fixed in the 
United Kingdom Trademark Act." In a 
loose sort of a way, the US common law 
incorporated the UK common law, but 
that ended by 1946." 
Therefore, Congress made choices in 
1946 when it included the notion of incon-
testability in the Lanham Act. The only 
31 See also 15 U.s.c. § 1065 (2008) (indicating that incontestable marks are conclusively presumed valid), 
32 Particularly in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits where incon\{'stable marks have been held as presumptively strong, even when 
they are descriptive. See Dieter v. B & HIndus., 880 F.2d 322, 329 mlh Cir. 1989); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th (ir, 
1988). However, admittedly they ilre in the minority. See Homes & Land Affiliates, LLC v. Homes & Loans Magazine, Li.C, 598 F. 
Supp. 2d 1248, 1261 n, 12 (MD. Ha 2007) ("Other circuits conclude lhill an otherwise weak mark is not made strong for the purposes of 
the likelihood-of-confusion ;mi11ysis because of its incontestable status. See Oreek Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc, 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th 
Or. 1987) ("Incontestable status dOQS not make a weak m<lrk strong."); See also Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., 43 
F.3d 922, 935 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that "incontestability affects the validity of the trademark but does not establish the likelihood of 
confusion necessary to warrant protection from infringement"); Gruner -I- Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (implying that the marketplace strength of an incontestable mark may be challenged); Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 909 
F.2d 250,252 (7th Cir. 1990) (incontestable status dOQS not preclude consideration of a mark's strength"). 
33 SIIELOO:-.i W. HALPERN n. AL., fuNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATf:S INTELLECTUAL PROP Elm' LAW: COPYRIGIiT, PATENT, TRADEMARK 293 (2007). 
34 In 1875 and 1883 Great Britain enacted statutes which essentially provided that registration of a mark would become conclusive 
evidence of the registrant's right to the exclusive use of the mark after five years after initial registration. Although these statutes never 
use the word "incontestable," they are otherwise strikingly similar to the relevant provisions of the ct1frent Lanham Act. See An Act to 
Establish it Register of Trade Marks, 38 & 39 Viet., ch, 91, § 3 (1875) reprinted in ROGER W. WALLACE & JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE REl.ATING To LE1TIiRS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 612 (1900); An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Patents 
for Inventions, Registration of Designs, and of Trade Marks, 46 & 47 Viet., ch, 57, § 76 (1883) discussed in GR.<\!,ME B. DINWOODlE & 
MARK D. JA.'-I!S, TRADEMAllK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 28 (2009). 
35 Trademarks have been officially recognized by English common law as early as 1618. See Southern v. How, Popham's Reports 
143,144 (1618), 79 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244 (KoB. 1907»; Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Al1glo-Americal1 Trademark taw Begil1? All AllSWl.'r 10 
Scheelller's COIJlmdrllllf, 8 FORDlfAM INTEl.!.. PROI'. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 517 (1998). In 1776, following the American Revolution, the newly 
independent states enacted "reception statutes" enabling courts to readopt and develop the British Common Law they had previously 
adhered to while colonies. Charles A. Bane, Fr0111 Holl and MaJisfieid 10 Story to UewellYIl alld Ml'l1lsc/Jikof[: The Progressive Developmel1t of 
COlllmercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 363 (]983). By guaranteeing that judicial proceedings would follow the COUTse of established 
common law, the Northwest Ordinance, approved by Congress in 1787, furthered this !lotion for the advancing territories. Peter L. 
Strauss, Federal COllrls alld tire Common lAW, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 891, 910 n.96 (2002). In this way, historic Anglo-Saxon based common law 
was eventually incorporated in all the newly created states (except Louisiana, who adopted a bijuridical system based on the Napoleonic 
Code of 1804). Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 853 (9th Cir. 2001); Guy Canivet, Frellcil 
Civil Lllw Between Past mid Revivlll, 20 CO~N. J. INr'L L. 111, 118-20 (2004). As the reception statutes became obsolete, the states eventually 
enacted new laws. New York was the first to enact a state trademark law in 1845. EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND 
UNFAIR TRADIt-:C 48 n.12 (1919). Despite only 62 trademark C,1ses having been decided in the United States by 1870 (40 of which were in 
New York), the first Federal Trademark law was enacted. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198; A",NE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GIl.SON ON 
Tl,ADEMARKS § 1.01[2J (Lexis 2010). Unfortun.'l!ely, under Supreme Court review in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 u.s. 82 (879), the 1970 trade-
mark law did not meet constitutional muster. Pressured by the international demand from commerce treaties with several civil law 
countries (Russia, Belgium and France between 1868-1869), Congress had failed to ground the law in the commerce clause as Thomas 
Jefferson's had suggested in 1791. \VILLlA~1 HE~ItY BROWNE, A TllE,\TISE ON THE LAW OF TrlADEMARKS 297 (2d ed. 1885); EDWARD S. ROGERS, 
GOOD WILL, TIMDE-MAllKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 48 (1919). The next significant attempt at a federal trademark registration came with tllE' 
Act of 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch, 592, 33 Stal. 724. England the same year. The Trade Marks Act, 1905: 7 Edw. Vll. Ch, 15. Both 
American and English versions went through various amendments, until a new English Act was eventually passed in 1938. Trade Marks 
Act 1938: 1938 ch, 22 1, 2 Geo. 6. This Act fundamentally changed the English system by permitting registration based on intent-to·use, 
creating an examination·based process, and creating an application publication system. England's new act greatly influenced Fritz G. 
Lanham, who the same year first introduced to Congress the American version. SHOEN O~o, OVERVIEW OF JM'ANr:SE TllADI:)'!ARK LAW (2d 
ed. 1999). See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.s. 418, 428 (2003) ("The United Stdtes took the [trademark and unfair competi-
tion) law of England as its own") (quoting l3. PAHISHALL, D. HrU.IARD, &). WELCH, TRADEMARKS AND UNMIR COMPETITION 2 (4th ed. 2000) 
(alteration in original). This act was finally passed in 1946, and took effect one year later. 
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source or jurisdiction that included a 
notion of incontestability was the UK. 
Congress elected to ignore the common 
law of the rest of the United States and 
embrace the UK version of incontestabili-
ty." Therefore, more appropriately, the 
Lanham Act should be said to be a "codi-
fication (of the laws we liked) statute," 
Incontestability was a serious expan-
sion of the trademark law as it existed in 
the United States in 1946." To be sure, it is 
a valuable encouragement for firms to reg-
ister trademarks. Given the incontestabil-
ity provisions, along with its conclusive 
evidence provisions, it would seem a vio-
lation of corporate fiduciary duties to not 
claim incontestibility after five years of 
continuous use.'" However, this is only 
one of example of many to follow of 
Congress expanding the trademark right 
way past any notion of what the Common 
Law of trademarks had been prior to 1946. 
B. Intent To Use 
The so-called Intent-to-Use ("ITU")" sys-
tem is yet another expansion of the 
American notion of trademark protection. 
Passed in the Trademark Revision Act of 
1988, the ITU system allows a trademark 
claimant to register its intended use of the 
mark with the PTO.'" Although section 
7(c) of the Lanham Act requires that any 
effect of the ITU system is "contingent 
upon registration of the mark,"" in reality 
the ITU system does grant several impor-
tant rights that are not contingent upon 
registration of the mark. By making "reg-
istration of the mark" a requirement, 
Congress attempted to make ITU rights 
contingent upon use of the mark in com-
merce, thereby preserving the constitu-
tionality of the lTU system," However, 
under the ITU system, before the mark is 
used in commerce, an actual trademark 
application is filed with the PTO and 
thereby a record of this application is cre-
ated. This application will be disclosed in 
all subsequent and relevant trademark 
searches. This gives notice to all subse-
quent actual users of that mark that some 
entity has claimed priority to that mark," 
Therefore, although not a part of the 
statute, an ITU application has a great sig-
36 Contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation, English judges refused to recognize il registrant's right to the exclusive use if il 
showing W<lS made that the mark had never been properly registered in the first place. See Park N' Fly v. Dollilf Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 
189,209 n.8 (1984) (Stevens, )., dissenting), 
37 See "Iso Maya Alexandri, The Jnil.'nliltiOlllll Ne..vs QlIllsi-Properly Paradigm {lIId Trademark Incolltestability: A Call for Ncwriting lilt' 
[J1I1111l1l1 Art, 13 Bar\,. J.t. & Tech. 303, 304-307 (2000)(cC]lIaling incontestability 10 the dubious creation of glwsi-propt'rly rights in news}. 
38 JONI\1HAN RWVID, MANAGING BUSINEsS lZISK: A PRAcrlCAL GUIDE TO PROTEClING YOuR BUSINESS 159 (2005) {stilling that not only is 
it necessilrY to register a lr<1dem('lrk, but it is ('Ilso imperiltive Ih('ll a company monitor the m(lrketplace for infringing competition and 
(nke ('Iclion when necessnry). 
39 The reilsons cited for instituting the intent-to· usc system were to eliminate foreign ildvanlage in U.S. trademark registration, to 
increase overall vnlue of the U.s. trademark system, and to bring the U.s. trildem(lrk system up to speed on current business priltices 
around the world. S. Rep. No. 100·515, ilt 5 (1988), ilS reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581. The intent-to-use notion was proposed 
multiple times throughout the 20th century but had been held unconstitutional in United States v. Steffens, 100 U.s. 82 (J879) due to the 
lacking 'use in interstate commerce' requirement. See Sheldon Klein, Tmd('mark l.1lw Bill: Marked lmp)"(l1!l'IIlcllt ill Rcgistrati(l1J 1~ll/rs, 11 
LEGlIl. TIMES, May 30, 1988, at 16. 
40 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2008). 
41 15 U.S.c. § 1057(c} (2008). 
42 Unlike piltent ilnd copyright protection which me expressly provided for in the Constitution, U.S. trademark protection is 
derived from the Constitution's commerce clause. U.s. Cons!. art. 1. § 8 d. 3. 
43 E.g., David A. Cohen, Trademark Scm·dres mId 1I1Vl'5Iigl1limls, ill PATENTS, COJ'YRtGIITS, TRlIl)I;MARKS, ANt) LnHUlRY PROPERTY COURSE 
H,\NDBOOK SEllIES, 35, 37 (2001) [hereinilfter COllEN]; J JAY DllATLEi< & STEJ'HEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PIlOI'ERTY Lllw: CmlMERCJAl.AND 
INDUSTRIAL PROI'ERn", § 1.06 (2003). 
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nificant deterrent effect for the ITU 
claimant. As firms are naturally conflict 
adverse:' once a mark with prior ITU 
rights is discovered in a trademark search, 
firms will work around such an ITU appli-
cation, even if no use is ever made. 
Because the ITU registration gives the 
applicant three years in which to use the 
mark," during that three year time period, 
a third party will not know if actual use 
will ever occur. As such, that third party 
would likely steer in a different direction, 
even if use of the ITU applicant was never 
to be realized. That is, to risk adverse 
firms, the ITU system has a real and spe-
cific effect, even if all statutory rights are 
subject to use in actual commerce. 
Through the ITU system, trademark 
rights in the United States have expanded. 
Without recognizing it as such, the United 
States has taken a large step toward har-
monizing how trademark rights are creat-
ed. Most Civil Law systems create trade-
mark rights upon registration, not upon 
use.'" In fact, the ITU system is largely in 
line with all civil law nations, as use is not 
required in civil law countries prior to or 
as a "contingent" _ of registrationY Even 
though harmonization was not a stated 
goal for the ITU system when debated by 
Congress, it does result in a serious expan-
sion of the trademark right and continues 
the inextricable trend of expansion. 
C Dilution 
In 1996, the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act (FTDA) was signed into law by then 
President Clinton.'" This law did more to 
expand American trademark law than any 
other act of Congress. The FTDA allows a 
holder of a famous mark the ability to 
enjoin the use of the same or similar mark 
on completely unrelated goods or servic-
es." Under traditional trademark jurispru-
dence, before a cause of action for trade-
mark infringement will lie, the defendant 
has to be in competition with the plaintiff, 
44 See COHEN, supra note 43, at 37 (stating that i1. trademark search is "appropriate, and possibly necessary" to avoid costly and 
lime consuming conflicts with other potential mark holders); 3 McC,wT!w ON TRADEMARKS liND UNFAIR COMl'ETlTfON § 19:6 (4th eeL 2010) 
(advising companies to "obtain a preliminary determination as to pOSSible conflict with previously used but unregbtered marks, 
applied-for marks, and registered marks"), 
45 Although six months is 11K initial prescribed time period in which to use the mark in commerce an additional thirty months of 
extension may be granted to the mark holder for a mere showing of good cause and pilyment of the requisite fees. 15 V,S.c. 
§ 10SHd)(2008). AdditionaHy, even in the event of inilppropriate extension request protocol, a mark holder may stili redeem him or her-
self by simply showing that the delay was unintentional. 15 USc. § 1051(d)(4) (2008). 
46 Shohyoho !Japanese Trademark Act], Law No. 127 of 1957, art. 18. "A trademark right shall subsist upon its registration." 
(Translation by author) 
47 See e.g., Clark W. L;lCkert, Global '/i"ademark/Copyrighls Practicc-Protectiol1 al1d El1rm·CCmell/Iss1Ies ill PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMMlKS, AND LITERARY PROI'ERn' COURSE HANDBOOK SERICS, 171, 201 (997). Examples of Civil law countries that determine trade-
mark rights by registration instead of use include Germany, Japan, France, Spain, Italy, Korea, China, and L1tin America. ld. Although 
registration is not contingent upon use in these countries under specific limited cirCUlllstilnces trademark rights can be acquired 
through use alone. Thomas J. Hoffmann, Advanced ScmiHarol1 Trademark Law ill PalCHls, il1 COPYRrGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY 
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERrES, 253 (1995)(noting that in Japan il party seeking trademark rights through use must show a major 
portion of the public must be aware of the mark and in Germany more than 50% of the pubJic must be aware). See illso, Article 5, 
Algerian Ordinance relating Lo Trademarks, No. 66·57 March 19, 1966; Article 18 Japanese Trademark law No. 127 Apr. 13, 1959; Article 
59, Brazilian Trademark Law No. 5772 Dec. 21, 1971. 
48 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. 1. No. 104·98,109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051, 1125, 1127 
(2000) (amended 2006)). The Act was passed by Congress in December 1995 and signed by President Clinton on Janllary 16, 1996. 
49 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c) (2008). The FrDA a!lows the holder of iI famous mark injunctive relief when an unauthorized use of the mark 
causes dilution by either "blurring" or "tamishment." Jd. The 11'DA, however, limits the action to milrks which are famous. A famOliS 
trademark is one thal is "widdy recognized by the general consuming public of the United States ilS a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the nwk's owner." 15 U.S.c.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2008). 
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or within the natural zone of expansion of 
the plaintiff.~ 
For example, although Kodak brand 
pianos do not infringe the KODAK 
mark, it does dilute the KODAK mark." 
Dilution, we are told, is defined as the 
lessening of the capacity of a mark to 
distinguish itself." That is, the mere 
existence of another KODAK mark in 
the world reduces the famous Kodak 
Company's ability to distinguish itself. 
Therefore, it is actionable, even though 
there is no competition and even 
though there is demonstratively no con-
fusion possible.3; 
Some have claimed that dilution makes 
the trademark subject to property owner-
ship." Some have argued that it makes 
the trademark subject to copyright-like 
protection." Some argue that it is neces-
sary as marks evolve and become famous 
they must be protected them from free-
loaders so that firms will continue to make 
the investment in the marks.% No one 
argues however that this was part of the 
original common law of trademarks. 
Everyone agrees that it is an expansion of 
the United States trademark right. 
D.ACPA 
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act (ACPA) also expanded 
American trademark jurisprudence. The 
ACPA was enacted to prevent cybersquat-
ting, the act of using someone else's trade-
mark as a domain name." The ACPA's 
protection was intended to provide a 
cause of action for the registering some-
one else's trademark as a domain name in 
bad faith." 
The ACPA also created in rem jurisdic-
tion. This allows a harmed trademark 
owner to sue the domain name itself in the 
event the domain name registrant pro-
vides the relevant Registrar with a false 
name or address." 
50 See Lynda J. Oswald, Arliclr:"?umisil1l1clIl" ilnd "Blllrring" 1I11der Ihe Federal 'hlldclIIllrk Dilulioll Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 
259 (]999) ("The tr<ldilionai cause of action under trademark law is for infringement, which has its basis in the tort of deceit. Trademark 
infringement occurs when one party (the junior user) uses a trademark (the jUllior mark) thil! is identicil! or substantially similar to the 
existing mark (the senior mark) of another user (the senior user) on competing goods, such that prospective purchasers are likely to be 
confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the identity or source of the goods involved."). 
51 See f-LR. Rep. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995) (listing three hypothetical examples of dilution of famous marks contemplated by the U.S. 
House of Representatives, including: Dupont Shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos). 
52 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act (TDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 985, 985-86 (codified as amended at 15 USc. 
§§ 1125, 1127 (2008»), The TDA defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likeli-
hood of confusion, mistake or deception." Td. 
53 See 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c)(1) (2008). 
54 See Lynda J. Oswald, Articie:"TamisluHcnl" and "Blurring" Ul1der Ihe Federal Trademark Dil1/liOIl Ad of 1995, 36 AM. Bus, LJ. 255, 
262 (1999) (comparing dilution to the tort of trespass; like trespass, dilution is bilsed upon an injury to the trademark holder and the 
unjust enrichment of the pMty diluting the mark). 
55 Sce Daniel H. Lee, RCllledyillg Filsi al1d Fililire Harm: Reconciling COIlflieting CirCHil COllri Decisions Under Ihe Fedeml7)ndcmark 
Dill/tiol! Act, 29 PEP!'. L. REV. 689, 697-99 (2002); Roher! N. Klieger, Tradtmark Di/llliol1: Tile Whilllill:\ Awny of lire Rational Basis for 
Tradcmark Frolalion, 58 U. PITT. L REV. 789, 847 (1997). 
56 See H.R. Rep No. 104-374 (995), reprinted in 1995 U.s.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (stating that FfDA was created by Congress in part to 
"encourage trademark holders to invest in their marks to achicve the famous mark status and to recognize the investments that mark 
holders have made in making their marks famous."); JEROME GILSO,~, Ti<ADEMARK PROTEnIO~' AND PRACflCE, § 5A.D1(4)(a) (4th ed., Matthew 
Bench ed., 4th ed., 2004). 'The abundant goodwill and consumer loyalty inspired by a well-known mark is 'the essence of many il success-
ful business' and federal dilution laws protects the substantial investment necessary to advertise and promote the mark" Id. 
57 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACrA) Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-10,113 Stat. 1501A-545, 545-52 (1999) 
(effective Nov. 29, 1999) (codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (2008). 
58 15 u.s.c. § 1125(d) (2008). 
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In expanding trademark law in such a 
way, Congress has made the possibility of 
legitimate concurrent uses much less like-
ly and consequently given more control to 
the holder of the trademark.w This control 
which permeates cyberspace is similar to 
the general concept of moral rights which 
instill an enduring element of control in 
the creator of a work over their creation.'" 
E. Expansion of 43(0) 
The expansion of Section 43(a) claims 
under the Lanham Act are rather notori-
ous." Section 43(a) was first used to pro-
tect the shape of the Coke Cola glass bot-
tle."; It has since been used to protect 
everything from the inside of a Mexican 
restaurant and its "festive eating atmos-
phere,"'" to the green-gold color of press 
pads in the laundry industry,'" to the NBC 
chimes,'" to the vertically opening motion 
of a Lamborghini car door."' 
In Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods., the 
Supreme Court held that "any" name, 
symbol, or device that dentified the source 
or origin of some good or service could be 
a trademark." The court relied on the 
word "device" to conclude that even the 
smell or color of a product could be a 
trademark if it indicated the source of that 
good."; Of course, relying on the word 
"device" for these purposes is historically 
inaccurate. Originally, the word "device" 
meant a design mark, not anything under 
the sun.'" 
There is no doubt that Section 43(a) has 
resulted in an expansion of trademark 
protection in the United States." In 1947, 
there were few so-called nontraditional 
trademarks which relied on Section 43(a) 
for their existence." Since Qualitex in 1995, 
60 Sl:C generaHy Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Tile Digilal1hlricmork Righi: A '/i'Glib/ilIS New Extraterritorial Readl of United Siaies UlW, 81 
N.t. L. Rev. 483 (2003)(arguing that ACPA expands U.s trademark law too far pasl its' territorial boundaries). But sec, Roberl Nupp, 
Note, Co/ICI/1TCllf U$C of Tradellwks 011 the Illtemel: RccOIlciliJig the COllcepl of Geographically Delimited hademarks with tile Reality (If flie 
IJ1ienJe/, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 621 (2003). 
61 Eric M. Brooks, Comment, "TITLW" Jusm:E: SITF.~SrECIFIC ART MW lvloRAl. RIGHTS AnER U.s. ADHERE~CE TO TilE BERNE 
CONV1MION, 77, CAl.. 1.. REV. 1431,1434 (1989). 
62 Amy 13. Cohen, Fol/owilig llie Dim·/ioll of·Ii·llffix: Tmde Dress Law lind Flmcliollillity Revisited, 50 IDEA 593 (2010); David Klein, 711e 
Evel··Ex/laliding Sdiml 43(11): ~'Vi/llh(' BllbMe 8l1rsl? 2 U. 8M.]". I~TELI.. PROI'. L.J. 65 (1993). 
63 Registrillion No. 1057884 (Feb. 1,1977), pt·eviously 0696147 (Apr. 12, 1960). 
64 l~lCO Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd,505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
65 Registration No. 1633711. See ,11$0 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (995) (resolving a disngreement among tll(~ 
courts of appeal ns to whether a color alone may be recognized as a villid trademark). 
66 Regis!ralion No. 0916522. 
67 Registration No. 75883661. See also Automobili Lamborghini SpA v. Lnmboshop, inc., No. 2:07·cv·266·FlM-29SI'C, 2U08LJ.S. 
Dis!. LEXIS 52589 (M.D. Fin., July 10, 2008) (finding that defendant violated Lamborghini's federally registered trademarks when it 
advertised, manufactured, and sold counterfeill.ilmborghini merchandise including fully completed kit cars). 
68 QualitexCo. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995). 
69 "Since hul1ian beings might use a "symbol" or "device" almost anything al all that is capable of carrying meaning, this Ian· 
guage, read literally, is not restrictive ... If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a colOr not do 
the same?" Id. at 162. 
70 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., TIlE TRADE DR1;.$S bll'EROR'S NEW CLOTHES: WHY TRADE DRESS DOES NOT BEI.01'<C ON TilE PRINCIl'AL 
RECISTER, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1131 (2000); Tmdcmark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,373-91 (1999). 
71 Specifically the Trademark Revision Act of 1988's use of the words "symbol and device," which lin accompanying Sel1l\te Report 
states were employed "so as not to preclude the registriltion of colors, sh"pes, sounds or configuriltiollS where they function as trade· 
marks." S. REI'. No. 100·515, at 41 (1988), available at http://www.ipmall.illfo/host('d_resoul"ces/lip.1/trademi\rk~/ 
PreLilllhamAct .. 097 ... SRJOO·515.pdf. "The definition of 'trademark' is broadened to reflect contemporary marketing prilctices ... " id. 
72 See Kenneth 1.. Port, 011 NOlllraditioillal Tradelllnrk$ ____ Northem Kent. 1,. Rev .. _ (2011); 3 (Wi!1imn Mitchell college of Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010·05, 2010), ilvaililble ill http://p~pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.dm? 
abstrilctjd=1561230 (stating thai prior to Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995) only 93 nontraditional trademarks 
had been recorded). 
( 
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there have been 688 trademark applica-
tions for nontraditional trademarks 
(excluding product configuration or prod-
uct packaging, the original justification for 
Section 43(a).'-' Of course, relying on the 
word "device" for these purposes is his-
torically inaccurate. It has reached such a 
bizarre extent that one person was even 
encouraged to apply to register his own 
DNA sequence." 
III. Moral rights 
Much is made of the moral right in the 
world of copyright. Much more is made 
of whether the United States should or 
does comply with its treaty obligations 
under the Berne Convention that mandates 
the protection of some moral rights." The 
protection of moral rights as such 
fundamentally sets the Civil Law apart 
from the Common Law of copyright." 
Moral rights include rights of attribution, 
integrity, divulgation and withdrawal." 
In countries that recognize moral rights, 
for example, it is a violation of the moral 
right of integrity to colorize motion 
pictures if the original author objects. 
One way of expressing this difference is 
that the Civil Law recognizes the per-
sonalityn of a work, while the Common 
Law only recognizes an economic interest 
in the work." 
Although the moral right was original-
ly saved for individuals and not corpora-
tions, some countries, such as Japan, con-
sider a corporation a juridical person and, 
as such, recognize a corporation's ability 
to maintain and enforce moral rights.M As 
such, it is not inconsistent to express a 
corporation as an owner of the moral 
right of trademark. 
This distinction in copyright between 
Civil Law nations such as France and 
Japan compared to the United States is 
quite remarkable. It leads to many inter-
national disputes regarding the appropri-
ate scope of the copyright." 
73 See id. at Appendix E. After Qllalilex Co. V. Jacobson PlOds. Co., 514 U.s. 159 (1995), the average nontrflditionaltmdemark regis-
trations weIll from less than 2 per year to lleflrly 50 pel" yeiu: Despite this increase, nontrflditional trademarks still only comprise less 
than 2/100th of a percent of the totnl trademark applicaitons. See id. at4. See also Nick Pisarsky, Nor1:~ PoTAYlo-]loTAHlo-Lct's Cail/llc 
Wh(1/c Thillg Off: Trademark Pro/re/iOIl of Prot/llci Smmds, 40 CO;"'N. L. REV. 797, 803 1\.28 (2008) (showing thflt the percent of nontradltiofk11 
lmdemarks tlwt cannol be perceived visually was 0.00727(1,:.). 
74 Registration No. 76016924 (filed Apr. 3, 2000; abandoned Jan. 21, 2002). See also Frank "Dr. Future" Ogden's ",'ebsi!e available al 
http://www.drtomorrow.com/feature/slrllightgoods.hlml (IllS! visited Sep1.15, 2010) (stilting his belief that registering his DNA gene 
sequence as a trademark is necessary to prev(Ol)t "reproductiOll including the production of humans, clones, survival machines, or 
futuristic animll]s"). 
75 Kimberly Y. \V. Holst, A Case of /lad Clt'dil?: The 1I11ilcd S/~le$ mId Ihe Prolce/ion of !l10ml RigIJ/$ it! Inlellccllml Properly Lnw, 3 BUFI'. 
iNTELL. PRO», L.J. 105 (2006); Cyrill P. Rigil.lnonli, Oesconsirucii1Jg Moml j(igiJIs, 47 HARV. IN·!"L L.]. 353 (2006); Jane Ginsburg, Moml Righls 
in Il COHJUJOIJ taw Syslcm, i/1 MORIIL RIGHTS PI~OTECTION IN II COl'YR1GIrr SYSTEM 18 (Peter Anderson & Oflvid Saunders eds., 1992). 
76 Sheldon Hillpern, Of Moml j(iglri and Moral RigiJIc()JlSJlfSS, 1 MIIRQ. INT~LL. PROP. L. REV. 6S (1997). 
77 MELF1LLE B. NIMMER & DIIV11) N1M),.jU~, NIMMER ON COl'YR1Glrr, § 80.D1. 
78 J do not intend nor do J think it necessary 10 take sides in the dehate regarding whether the moral right should he protected sep-
arately front the copyrightllll\,s of IIny jurisdiction (dualist view) or Whether they should or are best conceived of as pmt of the copy-
right regime of ilny jmisdiction (monist view). I illn merely making the general claim that moml rights protect the personality of a 
work and that trademarks in the United States have taken on u personality thill Congre"s at least seems to think is worthy of protection. 
See generally, Cyrlll P. Rigamon!i, !he CO!1ccp/IlIlI THIH."lommfiou of Moml EiShls, 55 A).1. J. Cmll'. L. 67, 73-·76 (2007). 
79 MELFlLLl, B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 0)\1 COPYRIGHT, §. SO.01. 
80 KOllumi, K.K. v.lchiro KOlnilmi, 1696 Hamei ljho 145 (Tokyo O. Ct. Aug. 30, 1999). 
81 MOllica Kililln, A Hollow Viclory fOI· !lIC Commoll Lnw? Th)!s Illid J/ic Mom/ RiShis Exc!Jlsioll, 2). MAIN!AL1- REV. lNlEL! .. PROI'. L. 321, 
322 (2003) ("The continued s(]uabble over morn I rights between commolllaw and civil law countries is a stumbling block for harmo-
niz<1lioll of international copyrightlilws."). 
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A similar distinction exists in trade-
mark between Civil Law countries and 
the United States. The trademark right in 
Civil Law countries is usually justified as 
a property right." It is accepted that the 
trademark is subject to property owner-
ship. Conversely, in the United States, the 
trademark jurisprudence heretofore has 
been recognized as a right of exclusion 
based merely on priority of appropria-
tion."' One owns the right to exclude oth-
ers from marks which one has priority to, 
but does not own the mark itself."' 
As I predicted it would in 1994,~ the 
concept of dilution has driven a major sea-
change in American trademark jurispru-
dence. The trademark right in the United 
States has slowly come to be far more sim-
ilar to the nature and extent of moral right 
protection, rather than the mere right to 
exclude. Now, the United States recog-
nizes the personality of a trademark and 
the Civil Law nations continue to recog-
nize it as an economic right. The signifi-
cance is that, once again, the Civil Law 
and the United States do not share an 
understanding of what a trademark right 
confers. Therefore, the basis jurispru-
dence of American trademark law and 
that of the Civil Law remains disparate. 
The moral rights doctrine is a very 
broad idea that is said to protect the "per-
sonality" of a work." This doctrine gives 
the author the right to claim authorship of 
a work (right of attribution or right of 
paternity); the right to object to changes, 
modifications, or bastardizations of the a 
work (right of integrity); the right share or 
not share a work with the public (right of 
divulgation); and the right to remove a 
work from the public after publication 
(right of withdrawal)," Moral rights pro-
tect the "personal, intellectual, and spiri-
tual interests of the author."&; The notion 
is that the author merges him or herself 
with the work and as such the work 
becomes part of their personality. As 
such, just as one may not sell part of your 
body, one cannot alienate a moral or per-
sonal right in a work. My contention here 
is that as the trademark grows in strength 
and stature, lower courts and the United 
States Congress have come to protect the 
mark as a personality worthy of protec-
tion as if it were a work of the creator. 
As the United States trademark right 
expands in scope, this notion can apply to 
describe the functioning of the United 
States trademark right. Although the 
moral right is inalienable in most coun-
82 1 THOMAS MCCAlni-IY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th cd. 2007). 
83 The Trademark Cases, 100 U,S. 82, 94 (1879)("At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its usc, and not its mere 
adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, inven-
tiOll, discovery, or any work of the brilin. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded on 
priority of appropriation.") for an excellent review of this debate, see Simone A Rose, Will Alias Sllmg? Dii!llio!1 Protection for "FamOIlS" 
Trademarks: Allti-Competitive "Mollo/loly" or Eomed "Properly" Rigl!t?,47 FLA. 1.. REV. 653 (1995). See, also, David S. We!kowitz, 
Rccxllminillg Trademllrk Dill/liml, 44 YAND. L. REV. 531 (1991); Milton W. rhmdlel; Arc Siale AnlidilllliOll lAWS Compali1>le witil lire Naliollal 
ProteclioH Of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 271 (1985). 
84 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rcctanus Co., 248 U.s. 90, 97 (1918)("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as 
a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but 
a part of the broader law of unfilir competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is 
simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as 
his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business,") 
85 That a trademark dilution statute would create a copyight in trademarks that protect even the idea of a trademark, is precisely 
what has happened. 
86 "Work" is the term for the object of copyright protection. 
87 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLOSW", O:-l COPYRIGHT §17:23, at 17:200 (3d ed. 2005); Cyri1l P. Rigamonti, Tile Conceptllill Trmrsforlllillioll of 
Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMI'. L. 67, 70 (2007). The rights of divulgation ilnd withdrawal and not relevant to this discussion. 
88 Adolf Dietz, Ailli Cmrgress: Antwerp 1993: The Moral Right of the Allthor: Moral Righl~ ami the Civil Law COlUrlric$, 19 COLUM.-YLA 
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tries that recognize the moral rightW and, 
of course, the United States trademark is 
completely alienable, moral rights actual-
ly do describe the United States trade-
mark right as to the immediate holder of 
that right, whether an original creator or 
an assignee. 
A member of the Berne Convention is 
mandated to provide protection for two of 
these moral rights (attribution and integri-
ty)'" and most Civil Law countries do. 
There is great debate about whether or not 
the United States in compliance with this 
requirement even though it ratified the 
Berne convention in 1989." 
The phrase droit moral ("moral right") 
was first used as a legal term of art by the 
prominent French jurist Andre Morillot in 
1878." In Cinquin c. Lecocq;) before the 
Cour de Cassation, Morillot asserted that 
the property rights of an artistic work 
under copyright was not community 
property between spouses, but rather 
belonged solely to the creator." This con-
cept grew out of the philosophy of indi-
vidualism that thrived in France follow-
ing the French Revolution,95 Although the 
court disagreed, the court did recognize 
that the artist-husband alone possessed 
distinct moral rights over his creation," 
Following this acknowledgment, Euro-
pean courts struggled over which two 
German philosophies to adopt: Immanuel 
Kant's monist system or Georg Wilhelm 
Freidrich Hegel's dualist system." Kant's 
model revolved around the concept that a 
work of art is not merely an external 
object, but rather is an expression of the 
creator's personality."' Hegel's conception 
differed in his belief that the work itself is 
necessary for the manifestation of the 
artist's personality; therefore the artistic 
work is property to which the artist's per-
sonality is inseparably attached." In the 
early 1900's, German Jurist Joseph Kohler 
further developed Hegel's theories defin-
ing how an economic right in the artistic 
creation may simultaneously co-exist with 
"--89-id-,~;;'208; Edwilrd J. Damich, The 1«-:111 of PrJ'smmlity; A COll1l1lon--Lrlw Basis fa/' the Protec/ioll of the Moml Rights of Authors, 23 GA. 
L. REV. 1, 14 (1988). 
90 Berne Conven!ion for the Protection of Literilry ilnd Artistic \Vorks, ilrl. 6bis (Sept 9, 1886; revised July 24 1974 and amended 
1979; entered into force for the U.S. Mil!: I, 1989 (Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-127}) U.S.T. Lexis 160 or 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 
91 ElilA1beth Dillinger, Millillllillg Pimsso: The Cnse For AmCllding Ihe Visulll Artists Rights Act 10 Pmllide Protcctioll of Moml Rights After 
Dmlh, 75 UMKC L REV. 897, 906·07 (2007) ("(Ville may not be intellectually honest when we conclude thilt we can join Berne by deem-
ing U.S. laws to be in compliance .... ") (guoling 134 Congo Rec. H3079 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement of Rep. Berman». William 
Belanger, Article: U.S. Complillllet with the Berne COIwclI/ion, 3 Gw. MASO,\! IND. L. REV. 373, 390 (1995) ("Some commentators have sug-
gested lhat fuJI compliance \\'ith the Berne Convention would potentially violate the COJlstitution."). 
92 Edward J. Damicll, The Righi of Personality: A COll/IIIOIl-LaW Basis for Ihe Protcctioll of the Moml Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. I, 
29 (l988); Cheri), Swack, Saft'gJlardil1g Artistic Crcnliolll1nd fhe Cultural He!"ilagc: A Comparison of Dmil Mornl Bc/W£C11 France alld tlJe Uniled 
Sllltes, 22 COLliM.-VLA J-L. & ARTS 361, 373 (1998). 
93 Civ., June 25, 1902, D.P. 1903.1.5. 
94 WilIinn1 Strauss, Mornl Righ/s of ille Aliliror, 4 AM. J. COMI'. L. 506, 513 11.3] (1955). 
95 Laura Lee Van VeJzen, Injedillg II DO$c of Duly il1/o Ihe Doc/ril1l! of Droit MomL 74 Iowa L. Rev. 629, 632-33 (1989); DaSilva, Droil 
Moml alld the Amoral CopyrigM: A Comparison of Ar/isls' Rights ill France and tlJe United Slates, 28 BULL. COI'YlllGllT Soc'y U.S.A. 1,9 (1980). 
96 Edward Dall1ich, The Rig/I/ of Pasoualily: A COIIIIIIO!1LaW Basis for Ihe Pm/fetiOiI of IIle Moml RiglJls of Autllors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1,29 
(J988) 
97 DaSilva, Droil Moml aud tlie Amoml Copyright: A Comparison of Artisls' Rights ill Frl1l1Ce l1Iult/Je Uniled Siales, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'y U.S.A. 1, 12n.85 (198OJ. 
98 Cherly Swnck, SafegllllrdillS Arlisti("Crealion (/ud the Odlurnl Heritage: A Com/larison of Droit Moml Be/ween hallcc and the Uniled 
Slates, 22 COUJM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 361, 370-71 0998). 
99 Id. at 371. 
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the personal rights in its creator.'"" Morillot 
argued under the dualist concept, and 
after court's decision in Cinquin C. Lecocq 
this notion prevailed in France. '" 
Some moral rights scholars would dis-
miss the argument that trademarks in the 
United States have become subject to pro-
tection akin to moral rights out of hand.'"' 
However, those who dismiss are talking 
about what trademark jurisprudence for-
merly was or what it ought to be, not what 
it has become. 
A. Attribution 
The moral right of attribution is "perhaps 
the most important moral right.""3 The 
right of attribution allows an author to 
claim a work as their own. This claim 
gives an author the ability to object, essen-
tially, to a likelihood of confusion'"' over 
the source of a work. In Europe, this is 
known as the right of paternity. '03 It allows 
an author to claim or not claim that 
he/ she is the author of any given work. 
This is most analogous to the source 
denoting function in trademarks. The 
source denoting function tells a purchaser 
100 rd. ill 372. 
from where a product emanates. In fact, 
"[ilt is the source-denoting function that 
trademark laws protect, and nothing 
more."'" As we shall see, the American 
trademark right has come to protect far 
more than the mere source denoting 
capacity of the trademark. 
The right of attribution first had roots in 
ancient Rome, which recognized the 
growing problem of plagiarism. '" To pro-
vide relief to the angry authors, a cause of 
action known as plagium, meaning "the 
crime of stealing a human being" was cre-
ated in the first century A.D."" As the 
Roman Empire declined and Europe 
plunged into the dark ages, these concepts 
bowed to the authority of the Catholic 
Church, which gave little or no attribution 
to individual artists."" It wasn't until the 
Renaissance era when these rights began 
to reappear."" 
In 1498 Michelangelo Buonarroti was 
commissioned by a French cardinal to cre-
ate La Piela, depicting the body of Jesus on 
the lap of his mother Mary after the Cru-
cifixion, as a tomb monument in the 
chapel of St. Maria della Febbre in St. 
101 Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Mornl Rights Pro/celion ill tile lIlli/cd Sillies Ullder the Berne Convention: A Fictional iVork?, 12 FORDHA~l 
INTELL. PROP. MEDlA & ENT. L.J. 1203,1211-12 (2002). 
102 ROBERTA ROSEt>.THAL KWALL, THE SoUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING II MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR TIlE UNITED STATF.5 88-89 
(2010)("Trademark law is concerned wilh preventing consumer conhlsion, a concept totally unrelated to the authorial interests encom-
passed by moral rights."), 
103 Cyril! P. RigiuHonti, DecmJstrJlcliJ1g Moml RigiJIs, 471-l:\RV. INT'L. L.J. 353, 364 (200b). 
104 Rohert C. Bird, Moral niglits: Diagnosis Illld J(l'linbilillltimJ, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 407, 440 (2009). 
105 Dan L. Burk, Copyrigilllllll/ Feminism ill Digital Medill, 14 Am. U. j. GE'WEI( Soc. POL'y & L. 519, 545-547 (2006). 
106 Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Clr. 1979). 
107 Bird, Sllpra note 102, at 413. 
lOS See Cheryl Swack, Safegllardillg Artistic Creation mid the Cllltllral Heritage: A ComparisOIl of Droit Moral Be/weel1 FmJlceand the 
United Stales, 22 COLUM.-VLA j.L. & AIm 361, 367-68 (1998). 
109 Alicia Maria LaTores, Luca della Robbia as Maiolica Producer: Artists and Artisans in fifteenth-Century Florence, (May 5,2009) 
(\'Vheaton College), available at http://dspace.nitle.org/bitstream/handle/J0090/8394/1atores%20-%20thesis%20-%2009.pdf? 
sequence=l. 
110 Set' Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional \'1'ork?, 12 
FORDIIA~f INTELI.. PROI'. MEOlA & E"'T. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2002). 
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Peter's Basilica. The work was instantly 
recognized as one of the greatest sculp-
tures ever created, but when a group 
of locals crowded in admiration, 
Michelangelo overheard one of them cred-
it the work to Cristofaro Solari, another 
sculptor.'" That night, under the cover of 
darkness, Michelangelo crept back into 
the church and asserted his right of attri-
bution by carving MICHAELA[N]GELUS 
BONAROTUS FLORENTIN[US] FACIE-
BA[T] ("Michelangelo Buonarroti, Floren-
tine, made this") on the sash running 
across Mary's chest. '" This was the only 
work he ever signed.'" 
The trademark right of source denoting 
has become analogous to the moral right 
of attribution. Today, when trademark 
users apply their marks to their goods or 
services, trademark jurisprudence sup-
ports their claim as if it were carved in 
stone. Source denoting has become much 
more signficant than merely letting con-
sumers know from where a product emi-
nates. Now, a famous mark can exclude 
all uses of noncompeting marks that do no 
confuse. Now, a holder of a trademark 
can prevent its registration as a domain 
name even if there is no confusion. Since 
the inception of incontestability, the hold-
er of an incontestable mark may prevent 
others from using it even if it merely 
descriptive and therefore no trademark at 
all. In this way, holders of trademarks 
have come to hold something that seems 
akin to the moral right of attribution for 
their marks. 
B. Integrity 
The moral right of integrity protects a 
copyrighted work from change or mutila-
tion. This gives authors the exclusive 
right to display their work in the original 
form and protects against any distortion 
of that original expression. '" "To deform 
his work is to present him to the public as 
the creator of a work not his own, and 
thus makes him subject to criticism for 
work he has not done."'" 
The best example of the right of integri-
ty in operation is the battle over the col-
orization of movies. When a French tele-
vision station, La Cinq, gained purported 
rights (from an assignee of the copyrights) 
to colorize John Huston's The Asphalt 
Jungle, his heirs filed suit claiming a viola-
tion of their father's moral right of integri-
ty.'" Although Huston's heirs lost the case 
at the lower court because the court found 
that the television company did not col-
orize the original copy of the movie,''' the 
French Supreme Court reversed and 
found Huston's right of integrity 
infringed because Huston had created the 
movie. '" The Court ordered some 
111 V',!ILUAM E. \/"IIILLACE, LIFE liND EARLY WORKS, 223 (Routledge 1995). 
112 See id; see also GIORGIO VASAR1, TilE liVES 0)' THE PAINTERS, ScULJ>lDRS AND ARCHITECTS (AB Hinds ed. 1927). 
113 Aileen June Wang, Michelangelo's Siglla/lIre, thc Si:dcc!1th Cell/my JOllnlal, Vol. 35, No.2, 447-473 (2004) available at 
http://www.jstor.org/ stilble/20476944. 
114 Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Tile Moml Rigllt of IIltegrily: A Freedom of ExpressiOlI, ill 2 NEW DIRECTIONSlN COPYRIGHT 150 (Fiona 
Macmillan cd., 2006). 
lIS Martin A. Roeder, The Doc/rille of Moml Right, 53 HAIl\'. L. RIN. 554, 569 (1940). 
116 Casso Ie civ., May 28, 1991, IUOA 1991, 149, 197. 
117 ld. The lower court also refused to grant relief daiming that Huston signed aWilY his authorship rights in a contract with the 
film producer valid under American WI'.'. Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch 011 fhe ll1forlllalioll SlIperhighway: Forrigl! Liability for Domestimlly 
CI'e{l/ed COlltCIII, 14 CAiUX)7..0 Al<TS & ENT. LJ 523, 535 (1996). 
118 Casso Ie eiv., Dec. 19, 1994, R.LDA 1995,164,389. This would not hilve been the outcome in the United Stales as there is no pro· 
tection for someone like John Houston who did not own the copyright to his work. Jimmy A. Frazier, Comment, 011 Mornl Rights, Artist-
Cenlered l-,'gisla/ioll, aJld the Nokof the Siale ill Arl Worlds: Noles 011 BllildillS 1/ Sociology of Copyrighl Law, 70 TuL. L. REV, 313, 315 (J995). 
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$100,000 in damages to be paid to the 
Huston heirs and that the colorized film 
be destroyed.'" 
The right of integrity is very analogous 
to the dilution prevention right in trade-
mark law."o For example, a Paris District 
Court prohibited a director from putting 
on the play, Waiting for Godat, casting all 
actresses because it interfered with the 
playwright's intention that the roles be 
played by men.'" The court's decision 
was grounded in the desire to protect the 
playwright's moral right of integrity 
which would have been violated had the 
director tainted the nature of the play by 
using all actresses.''' 
Also, an Indian court found that the 
destruction of a publically recognized 
sculpture amounted to mutilation of the 
sculptural work and consequently a viola-
tion of his moral right of integrity regard-
less of the location at which the destruc-
tion took place.''' 
The right of integrity is very analogous 
to the dilution right in the United States. 
Now, selling Kodak brand pianos violates 
the integrity of the famous Kodak brand. 
The mere fact that another Kodak is on the 
market lessens the capacity of Kodak to 
distinguish itself in the minds of potential 
consumers, just as a moral right artist has 
the right to protect the integrity of his/her 
work. Buick brand aspirin, we are told in 
the legislative history, dilutes the famous 
mark for an automobile. If Buick can pre-
vent a third party from naming their 
aspirin "BUICK", far more is going on 
than the right of exclusion. Here, it is only 
theoretically justified if one accepts that 
the automobile manufacturer's right of 
integrity is being violated. That is, the 
very integrity of the aura surrounding the 
mark BUICK is destroyed. When the 
association is made with aspirin, the for-
mer distinctiveness of the mark BUICK is 
lessened (or destroyed). To allow the 
owner of BUICK to prevent this destruc-
tion allows that entity the right to prevent 
damage to the integrity of the mark. 
As such, the trademark BUICK is now 
protected as if it were appropriate subject 
matter of the moral right of integrity. 
119 The Huston heirs were awarded $74,000 from Turner Entert,linment and $37,000 from France's Channel 5. Fiml Filled [or 
Colorizing 'Jungle', ROCKY MNT. NEWS, Dec. 29, 1994 at 16D. 
120 Bird, Slipra note 102, at 439. 
121 Tribunal de gr<1nde instance IT.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch" Oct. 15, 1992, IUD.A. 1993, 155, 225; 
See Jean-LtK Piotraut, All AII/hors' Rights-Based CWI/rightl..!lw: The Faimess mid Morality of Frellcli alld Amel'i(mll.mv COHlJ1ared, 24 
CAI<DOZQ ARTS & ENT. L.j, 549, 605 (2006). 
122 Although this action W(lS brought by the estate of playwright Samuel Beckett, during his lifetime he denied (Ill requests for 
permission to deviate from the all male cast except one. The only exception was for Frau Osterkamp who wanted to lise a female cast 
for a production at the 1982 Berlin Festival. Beckett's authorization waS conditioned on Ihe audience's understanding of his complete 
disapproval of the modification. Later in 1988, a Dutch theater produced the play with (I female cast and wilhout Beckett's permission. 
\'Vhen Beckett pursued legal action in the Netherlands, the judge ruled in favor of mixed gender casting and found the play to have 
been true to its original form despite induding women. Outraged at this result, Beckett banned production of all of his plays in the 
Netherlands and amended his contracts with other countries 10 disallow any modifications to the play Or the stil.ge directions. See 
"VILLlA),1 HUTCHINGS, SAMUEL BECKEn's WAtTtl'-iG FOR GODOT: A REFEllENO; GUIDE 93 (Pr(leg0r Publishers 2005). 
123 In addition to the artist's moral right of integrity, the cOllrt held that mutilation of the sculpture violated the integrity of the 
piece in rel(llion to Indian culture because the sculpture had become a public emblem of indian heritage. Sehgal v. Union of India 
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IV. Tension between the Courts 
and the Congress on 
Trademark Jurisprudence 
A. Dilution 
Primarily at the Supreme Court level, 
there has been much tension between the 
Court and Congress as to the scope of the 
trademark. The best example of this is the 
Victoria's Secret case.''' In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that a claimant of 
dilution had to show that its mark was 
"actually diluted," a "likelihood of dilu-
tion" was not enough.''' Without saying 
what precisely (other than a presumption 
that absolute identical marks would be 
enough)'" constituted "actual dilution," 
the Court changed the analysis of when a 
trademark right was harmed. Up to that 
point, the test had always been a "likeli-
hood" of infringement. To change this to 
a requirement that the claimant had to 
show evidence of actual harm, when the 
alleged harm from dilution is remarkably 
speculative at best, was to nearly extin-
guish the cause of action. In the reported 
cases, after the Victoria Secret case, the 
number of cases plummeted.'" 
However, Congress, at the behest of 
Limited Brands, Inc., Victoria's Secret' PAC 
and Jack Valenti,''' the most influential lob-
byist in the 2006 election year, expressly 
overruled the Supreme Court in the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) 
of 2006.'" According to the TDRA, the 
appropriate standard of when a mark is 
diluted is now a "likelihood of dilution.""" 
Not surprisingly, the number of cases 
based on a dilution claim has rebounded. '" 
124 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.s. 418 (2003). In the opinion the court went out of its way to hint that "expansion of 
tmdemmk law beyond its usual bottndnries was not the product of a careful legislative process that considered its effect on other intel-
iectu;;ll property regimes." Dflvid S. Welkowitz, The Sllprcml' Courl mid Trademark Lnw ill tile New MillcJUlill1l1, 30 WM. MITCI-lELL L REV. 
1659,1700 (2004). See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement luw, the prohibitions against trademark dilution me not 
the product of common-law development, and are not motivilted by an interest in protecting consumers."). The opinion goes on to dis-
cuss how dilution was first considered in 1988, but W<1S deleted for concems of non-compatibility with the First Amendment When the 
dilution was finally added in 1995, the he<lring was limited to a single day <1nd no opposition to the bill W<1S wised. Id. at 431. 
125 Id. at 433 (stating that ambiguity within 15 U.s.C §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 confirmed "the {Supreme Court's] conclusion that actual 
dllution must be established."). 
126 Jd. at 434 ("[DJirect evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be 
proven through circumstantial evidence - the obvious case is one where the junior <1ud senior marks are identical."). "[M]ental associ-
ation will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the fMl\OUS mm"k. ... " Id. 
127 See Marc L. De!f1ache, Sarah Silbert, Christina Hillson, Article: Lifc Aftcr MO$e/c.ll: The Trademark Dilulion Revision Act, 16 TEX. 
INTELL. PRO)'. L.J. 125,149-50 (2007) (st(lling th(lt in the late 1990s there was a ne(lrly 100o/c. increase in trademark dilution l(l\\'suits; after 
Moseley it became much more difficult for mark owners to prove dilution). Between 1997 and 2003, there W(lS an average of twenty-
four federal dilution C<1ses per year. Following Moseley, but prior to the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, the number of federal 
dilution lawsuits dropped to illl ,wemge of just 8.5 pef yeM. See Tile IViliiml1 Mitchell Study 0I11)'ademark 1.itigatioH( <1vailable at 
http:// WIVW. wmi tchell.ed ul intellectual-property IMitchell-Study-on-Trademark -Litigation/. 
128 See Michael A. Carrier, CalJiulllg blltllectual Pl"OflL'rty Throllgh a Propcl"ly Paradigm,54 DUKE L.J. 1, 11 n.15 (2004) (discussing Jack 
Valenti's role in the "propertization" of intellectu<1l property); Erika Overby, A N<1tion of Whimps: the Polllics of Dilution Law (student 
paper on file with the author). 
129 Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2,120 Stat. 1730,1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(c) (2006». 
130 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 n.2 (4th Cil: 2007) ("Congressmnended the [TRDA] 
principally to overrule Mose/I'Y and to rcqtlire that only <1 likelihood of dilution need be proved."). See (llso V Secret C<1t(llogue, Inc. v. 
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cif. 2010) «affirming summary judgment for Victoria's Secret; after twelveyenrs in the legal system, finally 
the case is closed). ''The provisions of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.CS. § 1125(c), change the test for dilution by 
tarnishment from an '<lclual' to only a likelihood of 'harm' to the 'reputation' of thl' s('nior mark." Jd. at 385 n.l. 
131 By 2007 the number of feder<1l dilution lawsuits nearly tripled, going from an average of 8.5 cases to twenty-one cases per year. 
See The Williaw Mitchell Stud!! 011 Trademark Litigation, available at http://www.wmitcheH.edu/intellectui1l-propCl1y IMitchell-Study-on-
Tl"tIdemark-Litigation/. 
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B. Fair Use 
In KP Permanent Makeup v. Lasting 
Impressions I, Inc.,'" the Supreme Court 
attempted to further restrict the expansion 
of the trademark right. There, the Court 
held that fair use (and therefore a finding 
of non-infringement) consisted of conduct 
where a third party used a descriptive 
mark descriptively.'" If this happened, 
there would be no infringement and the 
defendant would not be required to make 
a showing of a lack of confusion. '" 
The fair use doctrine is yet to be coun-
tered by Congress. Perhaps they agree; 
perhaps there are more important issues 
on their plate. Regardless, the fair use 
doctrine may operate to provide the 
brake to the expansion of trademark 
jurisprudence that is required if we are to 
maintain balance between trademark 
holders and consumers. n·. 
132 543 u.s. 1ll (2004). 
C Courts Resist; Congress Favors 
Historically, lower courts were hesitant to 
expand trademark jurisprudence in the 
United States to the extent that Congress 
seemed to require. 
In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,''" the Second 
Circuit overturned a finding of dilution 
because the marks LEXUS and LEXIS 
were not similar enough. m In Fruit of the 
Loom, Inc. v. Girouard,''' the Ninth Circuit 
refused to find a violation of the dilution 
act because FRUIT OF THE LOOM was 
not famous enough.'" 
Over the 60 history of the Lanham Act, 
the total number cases that were reported 
peeked in 2002 at 101 cases.''' By 2006, this 
number had dropped to 53.''' The 
amounts of total damages and total attor-
ney fees awarded has continued to decline 
since 2000'''' even though the total number 
133 Allhough Lasting Impression I, Inc. had obtained incontestability on its trademark consisting of the words "Micro Colors," 
relying on 15 US.c. § 1115(b)(4), KP Permilnent Milke-Up, Illc. ("KP") maint<1ined tlwt their use of the same words in <1n <1dvertisement 
did not constitute infringement because the words were necessary to <1ccur<1tE'ly describe their product. The Supreme Court ilgreed 
with KP, ruling th<1t such iluse is fair. Id. at 114-15. See Sue Ann Mota, Arlie/I': KP PemlrlllcHt Make·Up v. 1.aslillS Impressioll·~·Thc 
Sialulory Defeusc of Fair Usc is AvailaMe iu Trademark Infrillgement Ca$('$ Without Negating Ow Likelihood of COnSIlIl11.'1' ConfllsioJ!, According fo 
lile Slipreme Caliri, 39 VAl.. V.L. REV. 327, 335 (2004) ("[T]l\e Lanham Act was not nW<1nt to deprive commerci<11 spenkers of the ordinary 
use of descriptive words."). 
134 "[A] plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable m<1rk must show likelihood of consumer confusion ilS part of the prima 
filcie Cilse ... the defendant hilS no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in filising the affirmative defense that a 
term is used descriptively, not ilS il m<lrk, fairly, and in good filith ... " KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 V.s. al 124. Nalurnny, it is only 
ilfler the plilintiff hilS made a prima facie showing that a defendant has a need for <1n affirmative defense. Id. at 120. Requiring the 
defendant to prove that the plaintiff cannot prove il required element prior to qualifying for the statutory defense is no defense at ali, 
ilnd simply "would make no sense." Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that there WilS no other logical way to interpret 15 V.s,c. 
§ 1115(b)(4). Id. 
135 DilVid S. We!kowitz, The SlIprcme COllrl alld '/lndemark I.nlll ililhe New Mil/emlilllll, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1700 (2004) 
("ITJhe Court may be signaling [hilt there Me limits to Congress's power to regul<lte these areas under the Commerce Clause, as 
opposed to the Patent and Copyright Clause."). 
136 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
137 See id. at 1031 ("'Dilution theory presumes some kind of mental association in the reilsollilble buyer'S mind between the two 
parties' uses of the mmk' .... Howevel~ if a mark circulates only in a limited market, it is unlikely to be <lssociated generally with the 
mark for a dissimilar product circulating elsewhere.") (quoting 2 J. MCCARTI'IY, TRAl)nlr\I~Ks M-il) VNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.13 <It 213-1·1). 
138 994 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir.1993). 
139 ld. (finding thilt the Defendant's thongs <1nd "bustlers" adorned with plastic fruit and whimsicil!ly nilmed "fruit flops" and 
"fruit cups," did not dilute the "Fruit of the Loom" l1l<lrk). The generiC term "fruit" alone is not f<1mOllS enough to wmrant protection. 
"Fruit of the Loom" gets its special force from the combination of the words "fruil" and "loom" used together. ld. at 1362. 
140 See The William Mile/iell Col/CSt' of Law Study 011 Trademark Litigatioll, Graph A: Total Numbl'r of Reported Cilses pef Yeilr, 
http://wwlI'.wmitcheILedu/intelleclual-proper!y/fiIes/WM-TMStudy·GraphA.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Grilph AJ. 
141 !d. 
142 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark E:aorli1m: Tht' Elld o/,n'adCllwk {.nw, 65 WA~I-I & LEE L REV. 585, 622-24 (2008) [hereinafter Port, 



























,f the prima 
.dense thClt il 
it is only 
ing Ihe 




cen the two 
lly with the 







FALL 2010 THE EXPANSION TRAJECTORY: ... 493 
of cases filed continues to increase. ") 
Although I have posited that the reason 
for this precipitous decline may be the fact 
that trademark owners are being over 
aggressive in filing law suits and thereby 
leading to many settlements,'" it may also 
be that the plaintiffs are settling the claims 
because they lack confidence in a litigated 
outcome. One way or the other, the data 
indicates that most cases end in a settle-
ment. Only 1.3% of all filed cases end in a 
trial on the merits."'; Perhaps the reason 
for such a high volume of filed claims and 
a low volume of fully litigated claims is 
uncertainty by both sides regarding what 
the precise parameters are of American 
trademark jurisprudence. 
Of course, the tension between the 
Supreme Court and Congress regarding 
trademark jurisprudence is rather obvi-
ous. There have been many cases from 
Supreme Court in the last two decades. 
After culminating in the high water mark 
of Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc."" 
in 1992 and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Products Co. Inc.'" in 1995, there has been 
a clear retrenchment of the expansion of 
trademark rights by the Supreme Cour!.'" 
First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Brothers, Inc.'·10 in 2000, Wal-mart had 
intentionally and specifically usurped 
Samara's design for children's clothing. 
Wal-mart sent pictures of Samara's cloth-
ing to its designer in the Philippines with 
instructions to copy it.'~ In many of the 
pictures, Samara's label was visible and 
Samara's trademark was apparent.'" Yet, 
the Court found that the Lanham Act was 
not infringed because Samara's clothing 
had not attained a secondary meaning in 
the market place. ,,, The Court dismissed 
Samara's claim in a short, 11 page opinion 
and created new categories for trade dress 
protection. They determined that there 
were three types of trade dress: product 
design, product packaging, and a tertium 
quid.'" As Samara's claim was categorized 
as product design, they were required to 
show secondary meaning where product 
packaging is protected without secondary 
143 Id. at 623, See also T/I~ ''','i/liml! Mitchdl (()/lege of Law Study (111 1radcllwk Litigatioll, Graph L: 'Iota! Number of Initial Claims of 
Infringement per Year, http://wwwwmilchelLC!du/intellcc\ual-property /files/V1lM-TMStudy-GrilphL.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010). 
144 See Port, 1hlrlrWII1'k Exiorliml, supra note 142, at 633 (riting trademark extortion as the reason why the number of d()ims is ris-
ing while the dillMges awarded by the coml" steadily decreases). Trademark extortion is the filing of a case that may not succeed on 
ils merits with the goal of reaching an out of court settlement. Jd. 
145 Jd. at 628. See illsa id. at 622 (noting that on avcr,1ge, ill trial, trademark holders have roughly a 55% chance of obtaining an 
injunction, and only about il 55'!,-. chance of receiving d"mages). 
146 505 U.s. 763 (1992). 
147 514 U.s. 159 (1995). 
148 Sheldon W. Halpern, Tmffickiug in TmaclHm'k$: Sell iug BOlillaaries for file Ulleasy /l.dalio!lfii1ip Betweell "Property Riglits" alia 
TmaclIlIlrk aIlil Pilliliciiy Rigilts, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1019-20 (2009) (stalin!; th,,! generally the five Supreme Court !r"demmk opinions 
in the last decade, <lnd speCifically Wal-m<lll <lnd TrMFix, "<lllempt to inhibit the prospect of tradClll<1fk law impinging on the bound-
<lries and limitiltions of pillent law .... ") . 
149 529 U.s. 205 (2000). 
150 ld. ilt 207. The designer /manuf"ctmer, Judy-Philippine, Inc., copied il total of 16 of &1111<1m'S gmJn<'nls with only lllinor modi-
fications in the design. In 1996, Wal·Milrl sold the knockoffs at a 101\'e)" price Ih<lll th<lt of Salllilra (whose product line was featured in 
JC Penney), generating more limn $LlS million in gross profits. Id. 
151 Smnara Bros. v. \Val-M<lrt Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Or. 1998). 
152 \<\'al-M"rt Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213. 
153 Id. [Ij 215 (explaining th"t <lllhough Two Pesos, Inc. v. laca Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S, 763 (1992) established that tr,1de dress can be 
held as distinctive without secondary meaning, Taco C<lbana's trade dress differed from Sm11<lra'S because the decor of a restaurant is 
either product packaging or latiulil qlll'a (i.e., the decor cannot be clM,sified exclusively <lS either design or packaging). 
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meaning.'" The tertium quid doesn't stand 
up to any sophisticated analysis. 
Next, in TrafFix Devices Inc v. 
Marketing Displays Inc.,''' in 2001, the 
Supreme Court held that road-side signs 
with spring loaded legs so they would 
stand up in the wind were functional and 
therefore not protectable trade dress. The 
Court held that the claimed trade dress 
was function because it was "essential to 
the use or purpose of the article.""" 
Through the functionality doctrine, the 
Supreme Court greatly restricted the 
expansion of the trademark right. 
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp.,''' the Court found that 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could not 
operate as an alternative to copyright pro-
tection even though the plaintiff could 
establish that it was the successor in inter-
est to the actual source of the video.'~ 
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., ,;9 
also in 2003, the Supreme Court held that 
the appropriate standard for a finding of 
trademark dilution was "actual dilution" 
rather than the far lesser standard of a 
"likelihood" of dilution. The Court re-
solved a debate regarding interpretation 
of the Lanham Act and whether the stan-
dard for dilution should be the same as 
the standard for infringement. The Court 
elected to use the higher standard and 
require actual harm to be show whether 
than a merely likelihood, the standard 
for infringement. 
Finally, in 2004, in KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,''' the 
Court again restricted the trademark right 
at issue and determined that a regLstered 
trademark that was descriptive had to 
endure other fair uses of that mark so long 
as they amounted to a descriptive mark 
being used descriptively. 
Therefore, put in this light, it is clear 
tha t the Supreme Court in the last decade 
has been attempting to reign in the trade-
mark right. 
In the mean time, Congress continues 
to expand trademark jurisprudence. 
Congress passed first the lTU statute, 
where a party's mere intent to use a mark 
can be preserved for three years.'"' 
Congress passed the original dilution 
statute'" and then the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act'" which expressly 
overruled the Victoria's Secret case."" 
Congress created the ACPA,'65 allOWing, 
for the first time in American history, 
154 Id. at 216. See also id. at 213. ("In the case of product design ... we think consumer predisposition to equate the feature with 
the source does not exist., . Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition Ivith regard to the utilitarian and esthet-
ic purposes that product design ordinarily serves ... ") 
155 532 U,S. 23 (2001). 
156 \d. at 32 (quoting Inwood Labomtories, Inc. v. lves Laboratories, Inc., 456 US, 844, 850, n.l0 (1982)). 
157 539 US. 23 (2003). 
158 See id. at 37 (explaining that if the Lanham Act were interpreted to include protection of the originators of the video, rather 
than just those who produce reproductions of it for &1Ie, § 43(a) would allow perpetI1"\ patents nnd copyrights-which is prohibited by 
wngress). 
159 537 U.s. 418 (2003). See supra text nccompanyillg notes 123, 126. 
160 543 U.S. III (2004). See slWm text accolllpnnyillg notes 132-\33. 
161 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-667, ]02 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2000)). 
162 Federal Trndemark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stnt. 985 (1996) (originally codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051, 1125, 
1127 (1996), amended in 2006). 
163 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Slat. 1730 (2006) (codified at 15 US.c. § 112S(c) (2006) and 
replacing the Federal Tradelllilrk Dilutioll Act, Pub. L. 104-98). 
1M Moseley \" V Secret Catalogue, Inc,537 US. 418 (2003). 








FALL 2010 THE EXPANSION TRAJECTORY: ... 495 
jurisdiction for a trademark cause of 
action to be found in rem."" Additionally, 
the new act also contains provisions for 
statutory damages. ," Never before in the 
history of the United States had i11 rem 
jurisdiction for any trademark related 
cause of action been recognized. Never 
before in the history of the United States 
has statutory damages been recognized 
in a trademark case. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that the 
Supreme Court and the United States 
Congress do not agree on the appropriate 
scope of trademark protection or, more 
generally, on precisely what the parame-
ters of trademark jurisprudence are. 
v. Normative Result: The 
US Protects the Personality 
of a Trademarkt 
Therefore, the result of this is that the 
lower courts have been forced by 
Congress to recognize a new breed of 
trademark jurisprudence. This new breed 
of trademark jurisprudence is not set 
upon the trademark right being a right of 
exclusion where the claimant is allowed 
to enforce a mark to the extent that they 
use it and as long as they use it. This 
used to be called the Law and Prophets of 
trademark jurisprudence."~ 
166 See 15 us.c. § 1125(d)(2) (2006). 
167 See 15 U.S.C § lJl7(d) (2006). 
Instead, today, the personality of the 
trademark is protected. The source denot-
ing function of trademark protection has 
been usurped by Congress. That right is 
now better described as the right of attri-
bution. Trademark owners are no longer 
the owner of just a right to exclude others 
to the extent they use the mark and for as 
long as they use the mark. Now, the 
source denoting function of a mark has 
become a moral right of attribution: a per-
sonal right of the holder of the trademark. 
When a famous mark is used on unre-
lated goods today, Congress and the lower 
courts claim that the mark as been diluted. 
However, there is no conceptual justifica-
tion under the original trademark 
jurisprudence in the United States to sup-
port the notion of trademark dilution. ,;0 It 
is fully supported if one accepts the moral 
right of integrity of a mark. Under this 
notion, any subsequent use by anyone on 
unrelated goods operates just like the 
moral right of integrity. The trademark 
owner has the absolute right to protect the 
integrity (Congress this the protection of 
distinctiveness)"" of its mark. 
Therefore, the nature of trademark 
jurisprudence in America has changed. In 
the times of Learned Hand, it was a mere 
tort where harm in the form of confusion 
had to be alleged and proved before 
168 Yale EJec. Corp. v. l~ober!sol\, 26 F,2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928) ("The lilw of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this-as judges 
lHlve repeated ag<1in and again-that one merchant sll<l1l1101 diver! customers from another by representing what he sells as em<ln<lting 
from the second. This has been, ,md perhaps eVe!l more no\\' is, the whole L1W and the Prophets on the subject though it assumes IllallY 
guises."), 
169 Mosele)' v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U,$. 418, 429 (2003) ("Unlike traditional in(ringenWll[ law, the prohibitions against 
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated an interest in protecting the consumers."); 
see also, Delflache supra note 126, at 126 kiting the 1927 Harvard Law l~eview article written by Frank L Scheeler on which the founda-
tion of our modern trademark theory lies). 
170 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 explicitly provides protection for marks which are either inherently distinctive or 
those which have acquired distinctiveness, from dilution or diminishment of that distinctive quality. 15 US.c. § 1125(c) (Lanham Act 
§ 42). Likewise, the moral right of integrity serves the sole purpose of protecting that same distinctive quality by limiting the publiC'S 
ability to alter a given work. BLACK'S LAW DICl'JO;-;'Al<Y 675 (8th ed. 2004). 
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recovery could be had. Today, the person-
ality of the mark is protected. The trade-
mark holder's personality (in the form of 
reputation) has merged with the expres-
sion of its trademark. 
The primary problem with this is that 
the Constitution upon which the federal 
trademark right is based'" has not changed 
while the trademark right has gone 
through this metamorphosis. The Com-
merce Clause, has not changed. Therefore, 
actual commerce is still constitutionally 
required before federal trademark protec-
tion is authorized. Although the Lanham 
Act was selectively amended to make this 
metamorphosis possible, neither the leg-
islative history nor the fundamental 
aspects of the Lanham Act have changed. 
If the a trademark metamorphosis was 
desired, our society ought to go through 
some thought and introspection regarding 
the appropriate scope of trademark pro-
tection. The Lanham Act should not be 
changed to simply be responsive to some 
lobbyist's demands'" or some specific 
company or industry's concerns.'" The 
171 U.s. CO:-.lsr. art. i, § 8, d, 3. 
appropriate scope of trademark protec-
tion affects us all.'" As such, we all ought 
to be involved in the discussion, not just 
some Congresspeople who become con-
vinced that some element of the Lanham 
Act needs tweaking. Over the last 20 
years, this tweaking has transformed 
trademark jurisprudence in the United 
States from a tort in the form of a right of 
exclusion to an inalienable moral right 
where the personality of the trademark 
has an existence and that existence is 
ascribed to the holder of the mark and is 
protected as such. 
The net result of the various amend-
ments and the various lower court opin-
ions is that the trademark right has been 
transformed. The lower courts have plen-
ty of direction from the Supreme Court 
that the expansion of trademark jurispru-
dence should be slowed down. However, 
the lower courts seem to be embracing the 
notion of expansion of trademark rights 
focusing, instead, on the will of Congress 
even beyond what is literally required by 
the Lanham Act. '" 
172 The rcasons suggested by manufacturers for extending protection of their famolls ll\(Irks were "(1) they had invested time and 
effort in cultivation these ["molls !l\ilrk and thus deserved l('gill protectioni and (2) other countries alrcildy had such prohibition iJl\d it 
was important tlwt the United Slates no! lag behind any nation in the strength of its intellectual-proper!y proetctions." William W. 
Fisher III, Gcisliges EiscnillJll'rill allSIIfemder l~echls/Jacicll: Die Gcscllichle des ldcCIIsclllllzc$ ill dell VerriniglNI 51aaleli ill figcH/llm im illtcr-
lIalionale/l Vagldch [Tile Grow/l! of lute/lcc/lwl Properly: A I lis/ory of Ihe OwnCfship of ld('tls ill IIJI' lIlIilcd Siales], V,\NDr:NI {OECK & RUf'RECI n 
265, 283 (1999) (ERG); see H.K REI'. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 1029, 1030 (noting the 'substantial invest-
Jnrnl' made by various famoHs mark holders as a reason for the legislation). 
173 Creative industries stich as film production, new product development, publishers, and the like (lfe constmllly pushing for 
increased intellectual property protection as their profitability heavily depends upon it. William W. Fisher !Il, G1'isl(~t's [(~t'I1IU1l1-dll 
allslIfcmrlcr Necillsbt'l"eicl!: Die Gescllichle des Ideellsciwtzcs ill dell VcreinigfclI Slaa/en in Eigentlml illl ill/emaljona/tII Velsldeli !Jile Growill of 
liJlellccfual Property: A /-lis/my of Ille O,mwrship of Ideas ill the UHilcd Slates], VANDENHOECK & RUl'llECHT 265, 283 (1999) (F.R.G). 
174 How and to what end the scope of trademark protection affects ali individuals of society is debatable yet the fact that it does is 
undeniable. Compare Deborah R. Gerhardl, Cmlsmllcr hwes/melll ill TmdclI1ark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427 (2010) (arguing that the public inter-
est d('servcs more consideration when deciding trademark matters for the investment made by consumer through brand loyalty), and 
Kristan Friday, Does Dill/tioll Make Tmdcmarks i/ltO UllcOJlsliluliollll1 PIl/('II/S?, 12 J. CO,'HEMP. LEG,,!.ISSIJES 180, 181 (stating that the FTDA 
a\lthorizes a legal monopoly on a mark and impairs others ability to make use of that mark), with Mathias Strassel; The RaliOJII1/ /3l1si;; of 
J)wiemark Protectioll Reuisiffd: Plltting the Dilu/ioll Doc/rille into COII/I.'X/, 10 fOIWIIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 425 (2000) 
(arguing that for trademarks to continue to fulfill their economic ptlrpose, protection against dilution is essential despite the potential 
anti-competitive result). 
175 Lower courts are exp<lllding trademark rights by redefining trademark use, Stephanie Yti Lim, Comment, Gm Google /)1.' Liable for 
1)·adcmllrk Infrigelllelll? A l.ook allhe "Trademark Use" Reqllircl11cll/ as Applied 10 Goog!;! Awords, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 265, 278, (2007) kiting 
Google v. American mind, No. C 03·05340 JI~ 2005 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005), by extending the concept of actionable 
consumer confusion, and by widening the class of people who can be held accountable for consumer confusion. Stacey L Dogan & Mark 
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VII. Conclusion 
Trademark rights in the United States 
continue to expand, The incontestability 
provisions of the original Lanham Act 
were an expansion not known to the 
common law The ITU provisions, 
where an applicant can register his/her 
intent to use a trademark without 
actually doing so, changes the nature of 
the trademark system in the United 
States which, for over 200 years, has 
required actual commerce prior to 
Congressional action to provide federal 
trademark protection, Dilution law 
further extends the trademark right and 
allows trademark holders to prevent use 
of their mark by noncompetitors on 
noncompeting goods, Section 43(a) has 
gradually expanded over the entire life 
of the Lanham Act to now not only 
protect color alone as a trademark but 
even such things as the opening motion 
of a Lamborghini car door, 
The result of this expansion is that 
American trademark jurisprudence has 
come to resemble the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity of the Civil Law 
world, This means that the trademark 
right is far stronger than it was in previ-
ous decades, This also means that it 
operates as a more effective sword in the 
world of corporate competition, 
This entire expansion trajectory has 
happened slowly but inextricably 
behind closed doors, Congress has 
made incremental changes over the 
years that add up to the creation of a 
new trademark jurisprudence, one that 
resembles the moral rights of attribution 
and integrity rather than one honest to 
the historical roots of trademark 
jurisprudence, If the United States is to 
so fundamentally change our trademark 
jurisprudence, a broader debate 
is required, 
